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The small boy who breaks a pot goes to tell his mother 'It
got broken'. Not 'I broke the pot' but 'It got broken'...
And who did this? We did. We broke, the pot.
- Jerry John Rawlings
President of Ghana
Opportunities should be given to women for greater 
participation in the nation's political and decision-making 
processes at all levels, especially at the national centres 
of power. Where necessary, appropriate training should be 
given to them to ensure this...
There should be greater openness in the process of 
designing the adjustment package, both within government 
and beyond. In particular, employers, trade unions and 
other relevant groups should be closely associated with the 
process both to improve the design of the programmes and to 
ensure their fuller understanding and support...
In making the protection of the poor an integral part of 
adjustment, the primary strategy should be that of 
enhancing their productive capacity through better access 
to productive resources and assets...
- Khartoum Declaration
Pluralism Revisited
Pluralism is a less than satisfactory terra of art for use in respect of SSA 
unless specifically defined for that purpose. The reason is its near
monopolisation by a specific formulation related to the conditions of a 
particular secular/Christian, industrial, high incomes, bourgeois democratic 
society/polity (the USA). That formulation is clearly not very relevant to 
Africa either in its institutional assumptions and tests or probably in a 
number of its more basio tenets.
-2-
Participatory pluralism is defined for purposes of this paper as including:
a. participation in proposal, preparation and dialogue leading to decisions; 
in their articulation and implementation and in monitoring, review and 
modification;
b. ability to, and practice of, self-organisation at levels ranging from 
basic community (village, neighbourhood, workplace) to national;
c. accountability of leaders and officials to the people who directly or 
indirectly choose them and to those they are intended to serve/lead.
This definition does not define specific structures. For example a single 
party system does not per se mark a polity/civil society as non-plural if a 
variety of organisations with participation - ability to act and to speak on 
behalf of their members - leadership accountable to those members exist. 
Indeed, if these conditions are met, the affiliation of such organisations to 
the single party may be consistent with pluralism.
Some Qualifications
Clearly the definition presented is in the form of an "ideal type construct". 
No civil society/polity is or ever has been fully participatory pluralist. 
The issues in analysis of any actual case are how wide and deep are 
participatory pluralist practices and what (both in form and in substance) and 
of what kind (e.g. legal, political, informational, real resources, political 
economic) are the main obstacles to broadening and deepening?
All three elements are required to define a civil society as participatory 
pluralist. Genuine participation’s absence clearly prevents pluralism as 
defined even if there are multiple, autonomous organisations. But genuine 
participation can be practised within monolithic structures with at least 
substantial accountability. If these structures either englobe and control or 
forbid the existence of other structures and institutions then they are 
clearly not pluralist however participatory, accountable and majority 
supported they may be. (i.e. a democratic civil society which is not 
pluralist is, at least in principle, possible).
Similarly, ability to effect and practice of effecting self-organisation - 
unless defined to include membership participation, selection of and 
accountability of leaders - is not enough to demonstrate participatory 
pluralism. The organisations might be quite hierarchical with largely 
self-perpetuating leaderships to a substantial extent accountable only to 
themselves or to reference groups other than their members. Religious bodies 
and heavily state or party directed trade unions often partake of these 
characteristics.
Pluralism In Africa
There is a tendency in Western - and perhaps not only Western - scholarship to 
see both past and present African societies/polities as neither participatory 
nor, in particular, pluralist. This appears to result partly from rather 
superficial study (especially of the pre-colonial period) and the use of 
competitive, multi-party electoral systems as a litmus test.
Many pre-colonial African polities were participatory to a substantial extent. 
In some at least particular interest groups or sub-classes were self-organised 
and had spokesmen within the political process. (That others were excluded - 
e.g. slaves and to a greater or lesser degree usually women demonstrates 
limits on the practice of pluralism but not its absence.) Many organisations, 
e.g. age groups (often parallel but separate ones for females and for males), 
religious bodies, economic groupings (including what could be styled merchants 
and artisans guilds) usually existed, had powers and functions of their own 
and were to some degree accountable. The hereditary principle was in practice 
by no means totally inconsistent with participation and accountability - 
albeit it limited both. Unsatisfactory heirs could be (and often were passed 
by) - the selecting in most cases had a range of candidates who could be 
picked without being seen to violate the hereditary principle. Further recall 
- a fairly draconic form of accountability - was frequently institutionalised 
e.g. "destooling" and "deskinning" in most coastal, forest and savannah 
Ghanian polities. In any case except for political leadership the hereditary 
principle was far from universal - e.g. it does not appear to have applied 
with any frequency to age groups.
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Present African civil societies and polities do have multiple organisations 
albeit their number, diversity, freedom or space to act and degree of outside 
control vary widely. The area of political parties is the only one in which 
this is rarely true - mainland Sub-Saharan Africa has no competitive,
multi-party systems in which a transfer of power by a victory of the 
opposition parties is a credible, present possibility (albeit in two cases
opposition parties with considerable room for manoeuvre do exist and do 
participate in elections and legislative bodies but are most unlikely to win 
majority support at national level).
At national level the main organisations with societal functions are usually
religious, labour (more specifically trade unions), women’s and - less
uniformly - co-operatives. Peasant organisations with broad bases and 
significant functions/influence are quite uncommon. A range of other bodies - 
e.g. St. John’s Ambulance Society, Red Cross - usually exist but are largely 
urban and narrowly middle class/Westernised in their memberships. Others - 
e.g. National Red Cross Societies - are common but vary from substantial
participatory, accountable and self-defining as to programme (e.g. Mozambique)
to de facto statal entities. Locational or home origin groups appear to be 
less significant than in the past especially beyond mobilising support for (or 
from) their home districts or localities. In that sense they are becoming 
less national and more regional or local.
The range at regional level is probably analogous to national. But at local 
(basic community) level there is usually a greater degree of complexity and 
more organisations. Some are more or less adapted forms of traditional 
organisations (e.g. age groups and in some cases formally superseded
hereditary political groupments). - Others - e.g. peasants, co-ops, womens 
groups - for one reason or another lack any real connection to broader
organisational structures.
Persistent Poverty
Sub-Saharan Africa has never had a high level of achieved productive forces 
per capita nor a particularly egalitarian income distribution. Therefore, 
poverty has been both persistent and widespread.
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The degrees, immediate causes and forms of poverty were neither uniform nor 
stable before, during nor after colonialism. With very few exceptions the 
achieved productive forces per capita declined and the proportion of the 
population in absolute poverty (and, much less certainly or uniformly, the 
gini coefficient measure of inequality) rose from 1979 through 1983* In many, 
probably a majority of cases, this process of immiserisation and/or 
distintegration has continued to date. In others it may have been halted but 
not reversed and in a - perhaps increasing - minority it has, at least 
tentatively, been reversed and some ground won back.
The basic causes of the decline vary as to nature or date and as to severity. 
External economic environment worsening is present in almost all cases albeit
its onset varies from the mid-1970s (base metal and sugar export dominated
economies) through the turn of the decade (beverage buoyed economies) to the 
mid-1980s (where petroleum sectors had fuelled growth). Drought has been 
another red thread running through most. Gross domestic economic (usually 
paralleled by political) mismanagement outside or verging toward a civil war 
context has been dominant in some cases, e.g. Ghana (1972-1981) and Zaire
(i960--- •>) respectively. External aggression (notably in Southern Africa)
and civil or civil cum regional wars (notably in the Horn, Morocco/Saoura 
Democratic Republic and Uganda) have been the dominant cause in several cases 
(e.g. Angola, Mozambique, Malawi since 1985, Uganda, Ethiopia/Eritrea, 
Somalia, Sudan and - albeit both appear to have achieved trend reversals - 
Zimbabwe and Tanzania). Failure to react to other factors with adequate 
speed, degree and flexibility is a pervasive characteristic but whether 
dominant in any case is arguable (Zambia, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon and Nigeria are 
possible examples).
In most cases more than one factor has been present and it is their cumulative 
interaction which has led to the deterioration. For example, Tanzania had 
extreme terms of trade shocks over 1978-81; major external aggression and
consequential costs over about the same period and again from late 1986;
drought over 1979-1985; major policy mistakes (notably premature and overdone 
import liberalisation and grossly lax fiscal policy) over 1977-79 and an 
initial lag in policy response over 1978-79 which clearly was not fully (or at 
any rate substantially) overcome until 1984 even though that process began in 
1980.
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Poverty, Production and Distribution
Poverty exists personally and at household level (e.g. entitlement to an 
adequate diet); communally (e.g. access to basic health and education 
services); regionally (e.g. marginalisation from the national economy which, 
however weak that economy may be is rarely advantageous to the marginalised 
one (e.g. Upper and Northern Ghana albeit Senegal's Casamance is arguably an 
exception); infrastructurally (e.g. transport and communication) and 
nationally (e.g. low GDP/capita and inability to sustain increases thereof).
Therefore in any assessment of policies institutions or societal patterns 
their productive efficiency matters. Without GDP, food production and export 
growth higher than that of population few - or no - SSA economies can attain 
either stable, strong economic structures and processes or substantial, 
sustained reductions of the number of persons living in absolute poverty.
Distribution is also relevant. The dominant impact on distribution comes from 
levels and specific structures of production. For example, the strength of 
trade unions and the institutional patterns of the labour market dominate real 
wage levels and trends given output levels whereas the pattern, support for 
and trends in agriculture among small, middle and large peasants (in the 
Maoist sense), capitalist form enterprises (corporate or otherwise) and state 
or cooperative sub-sectors is likely to dominate rural income distribution (as 
well as levels, trends and makeup of agricultural output).
However, the production impact on distribution may be indirect. The clearest 
example is the Botswana diamond sector. 75Í of gross surplus (itself about 
751 of gross output) goes to the state and a substantial portion is used to 
broaden wage employment, provide near universal access basic services and 
provide part-time employment and personal consumption supplements to members 
of 'poverty focus groups'. More generally communal, infrastructural and 
regional poverty (as defined above) require a catalytic initial and usually a 
dominant subsequent central government role if they are to be addressed and 
redressed on a rapid and sustained basis. The implications of this for fiscal 
policy (on both revenue and expenditure side) including levels relative to GDP 
and to allocation are presumably evident at least in general terms.
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Development Without Growth?
Nominally absolute poverty reduction - especially personal and communal and, 
still more nominally, regional - could be pursued within a constant per capita 
(albeit that means a 3Í absolute trend growth rate, well above SSA's average 
since 1980). However, the social and political constraints on such a 
redistributive process out of fixed total resources are usually (perhaps 
always except in the context of total revolution or the immediate aftermath of 
decolonisation or civil war) such as to prevent its being very far-reaching. 
Radically altered allocations of additional resources (relative to the 
existing pattern) are much less difficult to attain and - especially - to 
sustain. Further, for lower, and probably most lower middle income economies 
the room for manoeuvre from redistributing what exists is very narrow to 
negative especially where (as in Tanzania) substantial anti-poverty and 
egalitarian redistribution had previously been carried out under more buoyant 
economic circumstances.
Therefore, while it is certainly true that growth without development is all 
too possible the inverse, development without growth, is very unlikely to be 
attainable except briefly, to a limited extent and in special circumstances. 
No very evident case exists in SSA.
Poverty and Pluralism
It is not valid to argue that poverty either reduces the case for/value of 
pluralism nor that it absolutely prevents its existence. But it does create 
barriers to its vitality and breadth.
For example, poor, uneducated rural women usually have quite good perceptions 
of their own needs and goals and of what would be required to satisfy and make 
progress toward them. However, crushing time burdens, gaps in knowledge and 
skills, negligible resource availability above survival requirements and 
limited information on how to acquire what is missing (or how to organise 
groups to perform certain functions) often prevent the effective exercise of 
participatory pluralism.
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A second strand is a narrowing - especially but not only in national and 
provincial level organisations - of who is able to participate fully and who 
can afford to be a leader. Both require knowledge and time. Those with a 
resource margin above absolute poverty are more likely to have both. As a 
result they can be more effective leaders and their choice by poor members 
need not be either manipulated or subservient. Equally they may desire and 
try to be accountable. Nonetheless, the breadth of pluralism is narrowed and 
accountability rendered voluntary and optional which is inherently dangerous. 
(For example, Mwalimu Nyerere and his successor President Mwinyi are both 
committed to accountability but it would be hard to argue that the state 
constitution is adequate to require it albeit arguably the Party one comes 
closer. Therefore, a subsequent president with different values would have 
substantial scope for abridging accountability.)
At a somewhat different level economic decline increases tension. States and 
major organisations find themselves less able to serve their members, less 
able to buy support (or buy off opposition) and less credible. At the same
time they face rising levels of complaints (at least as long as their good
intentions and ability to do something to act on them retain some 
credibility), of demands requiring resources to meet and of challenges to 
their authority and/or legitimacy. It is possible - and sometimes happens - 
that the response does include seeking greater mobilisation and participation 
(to offset losses in other resources) and greater accountability (to
demonstrate that the palpable non-successes do not, or do not primarily, 
relate to lack of good faith or competence). What they are almost certain to 
include are limitations on expression - and more particularly on organisation 
- of dissent and caution in respect of autonomous organisations especially if 
they seek to broaden their scope of operations or to express dissent. 
Repression - at least episodically - is likely. Certainly these strands of 
constraint on an always limited, licensed and scrutinised pluralism in Kenya 
under president Moi have grown more severe as national poverty has worsened.
It certainly can be said that there are countervailing factors. Survival is a 
great mother of invention. There are probably more autonomous rural
organisations of poor people at local level now than in 1980 in most SSA 
countries. The reasons are the erosion of state capacity (which does create 
operational space and of margins above survival. Equally some existing 
organisations have been strengthened. This can be somewhat ambiguous. For
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exaniple, the long established Accra market women’s organisational structures 
have become tighter in terms of self-protection against economic adversity and 
a state which - notably in 1979 but - less vociferously or repressively also 
since 1981 is at best sceptical of their role. But because these are 
oligopsonistic structures which are increasingly (and on occasion increasingly 
violently) exclusionist the net impact on poor consumers, producers and 
would-be marketers is negative.
Other positive developments including broadening of roles - e.g. of churches 
into direct social action and organisation - and transformation of traditional 
structures. For example in Accra while extended family systems weakened with 
too many members needing solidarity and too few having resources to provide 
it, new neighbourhood, food seller/processor linked and savings/credit social 
groups emerged to fill some of the resultant gaps.
These trends are evidence of the viability and serviceability of pluralism in 
contexts of increasing economic and social stress. But they should neither be 
romanticised nor exaggerated. On balance the trend has been negative and 
while survival is a necessary priority by itself it is hardly an adequate one.
Pluralism and the Road Ahead
Looking per contra at pluralism and rehabilitation, recovery and economic 
transformation a relatively strong case can be made for its functionality in a 
"right to development"/"human condition" strategy albeit (somewhat ironically) 
not in a neo-liberal ("free markets make free men") one. Indeed the British 
experience since 1979 strongly suggests that neo-liberalism is inherently 
corrosive of pluralism, participation and accountability even in the context 
in which the elaboration of pluralism as an analytical conceptualisation and a 
normative goal was first carried out.
If production by poor people matters, the effective reach of the state is 
limited even in fields In which it should be present and decentralisation with 
substantial operational autonomy is likely to be productively and 
distributionally efficient then participation, accountability and parallel 
(hopefully complementary) institutional actors are important. That is in 
functional terras a substantially more than marginal case for pluralism.
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To suppose pluralism - at least under that title - to be a widely supported
goal, a conceptual focus or even much discussed in SSA would be a mistake. 
Traditional human rights, the interlocking right to development and the 
parallel "human condition" perspective or strategic focus are both more widely
discussed, more operationally formulated and more often perceived to embody
normative goals. Indeed whether pluralism - taken apart from participation 
and accountability which can be embodied in it but also, at least in 
principle, in alternative patterns of social and political organisation - is 
better viewed as an end in itself (normative goal) or as a functional means is 
an open question. In practice the question may be most since in the actual 
resource context of SSA multiple organisations and organisational linkages are 
almost certainly crucial both to economic rehabilitation and absolute poverty 
reduction and to increasing participation and accountability.
Before exploring this topic further it is useful to explore the emerging foci 
broadly describable as "right to development" and "human dimension"/"human 
condition" of discourse, rhetoric and, to a lesser but not insignificant 
extent, action in SSA. In addition a quick sketch of the economic context and 
trends is needed before considering more fully what, if any, is the portion of 
the answers which pluralism can be expected to provide.
Emerging Foci and Divergences
The basic convergence is among basic human needs (the right to development) as 
an over-riding target and universal access to basic services combined with 
more production by/fairer payment to the poor as the main (and economically 
consistent) ways to achieve them with the human investment for productivity 
approach (itself originally neo-classical and associated with a fraction of 
neo-liberalism).
This approach has been designed to refute the claims that while poverty and 
misery (up to and including premature death) may be deplorable "There Is No 
Alternative". In the process it has created a politically saleable message 
(vide the response to Band Aid and its extended family or at both grassroots 
and establishment level to UNICEF, the only UN agency able to finance steady
Pluralism - Right To Development - Human Condition
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and rapid expansion of existing and new programmes) and, potentially, a way to 
convert immediate emotional human concern into longer terra backing for 
rehabiliitation, recovery and redevelopment after survival.
There is not complete synthesis of the approaches nor tactical coherence. 
Production by the poor has encountered much more resistance (intellectually 
and by, e.g., the World Bank) than universal access to basic services - 
apparently because the latter can be formulated more generally, elegantly and 
econometrically and is consistent with some strands within traditional 
neo-classical economics. Similarly "human investment" - as a result of its 
origins and of the fact that middle and higher level personpower who (at least 
once trained/educated) are not/will not be poor - is not always clearly or 
self-evidently related to the short run human condition of poor majorities and 
of fractions within these majorities.
The initial tactical concentration was on the situation of people made poorer 
or more vulnerable by stabilisation and adjustment programmes. This did have 
the advantage of putting the Bank - and to a lesser extent the Fund and some 
bilateral agencies - on the defensive. (Rising malnutrition and, a fortiori, 
infant mortality linked to ones own programmatic advice are somewhat difficult 
to defend even if one is certain they are unavoidable.) At that level, at 
least verbally (and to a lesser degree progammatically), the battle is being 
won. Virtually all relevant bodies say that the human condition effects of 
stabilisation and structural adjustment measures must be seen as important and 
if otherwise sound policies cause deterioration additional programmes/measures 
to offset them must be undertaken. As the Bank collaborated in raising $70-80 
million for the initial phase of Ghana’s PAMSCAD which was marketed as such a 
programme, even if designed with a broader human condition backdrop, it is not 
all rhetoric.
However, three limitations confront any approach focused primarily on the 
"victims of stabilisation and adjustment" (or even the poor among them - 
bankrupted formerly rich parallel marketeers, more pungently describeable as 
"two-legged wingless vultures", presumably worry few other than themselves and 
their close associates but ex-middle income clerks and managers are prominent 
beneficiaries of some adjustment amelioration programmes including PAMSCAD):
1. it is very hard to link most general human condition deterioration to
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stabilisation/adjustment programmes per se as separated from the crises 
which led to these programmes especially as the counterfactual
progression in the absence of the programmes is often very hard to
formulate credibly except as a downward path. The exceptions relate
largely to certain types and levels of fees - notably in the health
sector and to general budgetary deterioration impact on social services 
more generally;
2. no programme designed solely to offset costs of adjustment can be
expected to address the basic requirements of all poor and/or vulnerable 
people nor to be more than an "add on" (or Christmas tree decoration);
3. if the human condition is the key test, then how it changes for all
people (especially all poor and vulnerable people) - whatever the reasons
for their initial poor condition - is the central justification or
damnation of any applied economic strategy and the means to passing the 
test are necessarily integral to strategic design, not add ons.
The Human Dimension and Human Rights
Any approach to development (or any other branch of applied political economy) 
inevitably has a positive or negative human rights component. Any approach 
centering on the human dimension has an inherent commitment to human rights.
Whether to all human rights, with what priorities and to what extent is a more
complex (and ultimately contextual) question.
The standard divisions between individual and communal, socio-economic and
civil, hortatory and enforceable, resource expensive and no resource cost and 
unifying or divisive human rights are distinctly unhelpful in examining the 
human dimension approach in relation to human rights. Indeed attempting to do 
so strongly suggests that these supposed distinctions are objectively
misleading and serve the subjective purpose of selective opposition to human 
rights and regimes opposed on quite different grounds not of supporting or 
enhancing human rights holistically defined.
Virtually all human rights are both individual and communal, basically for the 
moderately self-evident reason that human beings live in societies and
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interact with each other. Freedom of speech is usually categorised as 
individual. Yet it has meaning only in a community context (of auditors and 
interactors). Food security is usually classified as communal but eating 
enough to avoid hunger or starvation is equally surely a very individual need.
Similarly, socio-economic and civil rights inter-penetrate. Poverty and lack 
of education have a very negative impact indeed on ability to exercise civil 
liberties. Prevention of freedom of speech, of organisation and of political 
participation frequently cripple socio-economic programme design, mobilising 
power, implementation and error correction feedback even if objectives are 
genuinely related to socio-economic human rights. In this case the categories 
are not meaningless but the assumption of inherent contradiction rather than 
of basic (even if not total) complimentarity is wrong.
Whether rights are hortatory or enforceable is a contextual question and one 
with both political economic (resource availability and allocation) and 
socio-political (political and legal norms and institutions/processes) 
aspects. In most countries freedom from hunger/food security is in principle 
enforceable and in practice hortatory with uneven backing to putting the 
rhetoric into reality. The resource problem is one of priority in allocation 
plus practicable delivery (Subsidy or gift? Access to earned income? 
Capacity to grow more?) problematics. The socio-political may either be of 
norms (how repugnant is the hunger of others? How strong the commitment to a 
right to eat for each and all?) or of institutions and laws (i.e. of effective 
accountability). But the same is true of effective freedom of speech, i.e. 
the resources and mechanisms for most individuals actually speaking so that 
their desired audiences can hear and respond to them either do not exist or 
are otherwise allocated. Similarly the norms against and structures to 
prevent communications oligopolisation or monopolisation1appear rather weak in 
almost all countries even if the precise nature of quasi-accepted monopolists 
or oligopolists varies.
The resource cost distinction is a variation on the preceeding one. Again it 
does not hold up. Freedom from torture is regularly cited as no cost. In 
fact very often that is not the case. Properly equipped, trained and 
remunerated police, judicial and prison systems are expensive. So is 
unresolved and unsanctioned crime. Torture (no matter how morally 
unacceptable nor, for that matter, how ultimately disfunctional) can be seen
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as a low resource cost shortcut and not infrequently one to which poor victims 
of crime have no objection so long as they perceive it as directed against 
clever criminals who terrorise witnesses and buy up lawyers and the legal 
process. Similarly, if freedom from hunger in a given context requires low 
cost means to enable poor farmers to produce, eat and sell more food and urban 
workers to earn more and buy more food the macroeconomic results can be very 
resource positive (i.e. more resources generated than used) even in the quite 
short run.
In principle all human rights are ultimately complementary. In practice all 
are both unifying and dividing. Most do entail losses for at least some 
present holders of power, prestige and/or wealth. Others do lead to a tension 
of right versus right, e.g. small indigenous minorities' land and culture
rights can conflict with the need to earn a livelihood of poor indigenous 
majorities as well as with the greed of elites, the drive for homogenized 
nationalism of political leaders and the procrustean rule of rules of 
bureaucrats. Similarly ecological protection of the "wildlife heritage of 
mankind" which leads to opposing tsetse fly control even when the latter is
vital to preserving the livelihood of poor cattle raisers and to preventing
the re-emergence of human sleeping sickness as a major (and extremely nasty) 
killer, does - at the most charitable reading - raise conflict of rights 
issues. More generally, moving toward fuller empowerment to exercise rights 
costs real resources. Because these are scarce, quite genuine issues of 
prioritisation, timing and initial beneficiaries do arise. For example, if 
inability to import - say drugs and paper - cripples basic health and
education services while average calorie availability is satisfactory, 
promoting production for export (hopefully with attention to broadening 
effective entitlements to existing food flows) is not irrelevant to attaining 
greater effective human rights.
The human dimension approach has not systematically addressed human rights 
questions under that rubric. But it has made specific propositions which 
demonstrably go beyond the caricaturisation of "bread and circuses" sometimes 
applied by critics of poverty reduction oriented strategies:
a. the identification of actual groups of actual poor people;
b. on regional, occupational and gender bases as well as in terms of
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specific unmet needs (which may vary from group to group and place to 
place);
c. the repeated insistence on participation linked to self-organisation and 
expression by poor people;
As even the opening quotations from the Khartoum Declaration show, there sire 
certain problems. The increased participation.is sometimes viewed as "given” 
(a noblesse oblige not a rights approach) and there is evidently a perceived 
need to sell participation and organisation on productivity (avoiding errors, 
increasing mobilisation) rather than normative grounds and to smuggle 
accountability in without actually using the word.
But the contrast to the "modernisation" development conceptualisation and 
declamation is marked. Still greater is that with the "neo liberal" (whose 
human rights concept is that free markets make free men). Participation, 
women, identifiable poor people communally and individually are all to the 
centre of the agenda and at least in principle perceived as having the right 
to speak for themselves and to be listened to.
It is worth pointing out that the human dimension approach has evolved quite 
independently of formal human rights dialogue. Even the relevant African 
Charter and still less the UN Declarations or Conventions (especially but not 
only the Right to Development) are virtually never cited; the ILO Conventions 
are, albeit rarely. This is not a desirable situation but it is a factual 
one. One can argue that the economic-political-social condition and process 
oriented contributors to the human dimension approach should pay more 
attention to the human rights stream. However, the most serious gap would 
appear to be for human rights workers to build concrete interaction with real 
people in real contexts and how they could be empowered to broaden and deepen 
their rights and especially the components of the right to development. It is 
true that among African states there is a correlation between operationality 
of the human dimension approach (or at least key elements in it) and respect 
for human rights entitled as such but the concerns seem to be largely parallel 
and the interactions implicit and subliminal rather than articulated and 
expressed.
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This is not because human rights is a Western concept in substance, as opposed 
on occasion to particular verbal and contextual formulations. That argument 
does not really imply respect for cultural pluralism - it is inherently either 
racist or a defence of valuable wrongs flowing from the denial of human 
rights. African societies and traditions do have clear commitments to the 
duties of rulers and the rights (including participation and 
self-organisation) of subjects. Doubtless particular formulations - e.g. 
Locke’s version of the social contract or multi-party systems as the only way 
to ensure accountability - are foreign to Africa, but the affirmation of the 
underlying human rights of which they are particular embodiments is not. What 
are perhaps Western are: a.) the separation of rights and duties (which is
inherently as incompatible with Locke's social contract as with any other 
social compact formulation) and, b.) the isolation of the individual from 
human (social) contexts leading to a binary individual/state nexus (curiously 
inconsistent with actual human contexts, pluralism or civil society 
conceptualisations). It is not accidental that the African Charter 
encompasses both rights and duties and also the rights of peoples as well as 
of persons in their inter-relationships with other persons.
Before addressing accountability, external agency roles and the scope for 
legal processes and personnel it may be useful to set out a more articulated 
presentation of the human dimension conceptualisation and strategy as it has 
emerged and evolved in the African context. The African focus is not meant to 
imply that there are not parallel trends elswehere in the South (or for that 
matter the North) but that contexts are important, and to acknowledge that the 
author’s contextual expertise (or at any rate experience) is primarily 
Sub-Saharan African.
An African Overview
The human condition - the social fabric of people’s lives, the state of their 
cooking pots - is the ultimate test of development. It is also among the 
vital means to achieving it. The malnourished, the sick, the illiterate, 
those worn out carrying wood and water cannot work long, hard or very 
productively. To waste much of Africa's basic economic factor of production - 
the work of its women and men - by allowing them to remain locked in 
vulnerability, enforced overwork or enforced idleness and poverty is not just
-17-
a human and social failure. It is also gross economic inefficiency.
But the reality of what is happening today is starkly summed up in a 1985 
UNICEF poster of a young African girl. "What do you want to be when you grow 
up?" "Alive". For millions of our infants and young children over the past 
decade it is a plea which has gone unanswered. They are prematurely dead. 
Unless the right to live can be made real no other human rights are possible. 
For the dead there is neither a future nor future access to other rights.
The average human condition of our fellow Africans - women and men, the young 
and the aged, peasants and urban slum dwellers, the ill and the crippled, 
displaced victims of drought and of war - is appalling. Worse, it is not 
improving - as in most countries it was, however slowly, prior to 1980. It is 
worsening. The rips in the social fabric are lengthening, the cracks in the 
pots are widening.
These facts are statistically known from a wide range of indicators: infant 
mortality and life expectancy, malnutrition and food supplies, access to pure 
water and to sanitation, illiteracy and access to education, income per 
household and environmental degradation. They are sharply illustrated by the 
tables and figures annexed to this paper. The stark reality is that the
fabric of many African societies - national, regional and local - has been
wrent. The cooking pots of millions have been broken. To pretend otherwise
is to deceive ourselves and to betray the poor and vulnerable people; the 
women, the children, the displaced victims of drought and war, the poor
peasants and the equally poor urban slum dwellers.
People As Actors - And Scriptwriters
No nation can be great and prosperous the majority of whose people are poor 
and miserable. Those words of Adam Smith set out a central truth which many 
of his disciples now preaching sermons in Africa and at Africans would do well 
to ponder on and to use as a test of their own proposals.
The human condition of individual people, of families, of communities and of 
societies is - as Mwalimu Julius Nyerere has put it - the only ultimate 
objective, justification and validation of development. Human beings are ends
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not objects, actors not things to be manipulated. Of course increased command 
over material resources - gross domestic product to use macroeconomic 
terminology - matters for a nation as well as a household. Food and health, 
education and water, sanitation and environmental protection all require real 
resources. Of course balancing income and expenditure - closing external and 
fiscal imbalances - matter nationally as well as individually. Crushing debt 
and demeaning begging damage the human condition of persons, of peoples and of 
states. Of course choices and sacrifices need to be made by states and 
societies as well as by families and individuals. The need to provide for 
tomorrow and the duty to the rising and future generations are central to 
African thought and society. But these things matter because of what they 
mean for human beings - and especially for poor and vulnerable human beings - 
not in isolation from, or worse yet instead of, their impact on the human 
condition.
But if people are actors - participants - then they are also in a basic sense 
means. Means to achieving improvements in their human condition through 
economic recovery and development. Labour and land are two of the three basic 
factors of economic production. From work applied to natural resources the 
third - capital can be won. Created and embodied in productive assets: tree 
crops and transport systems, improved fields and power plants or dams, 
hospitals or health posts and factories, houses and shops, schools and mines. 
But the poverty, the malnutrition, the inadequate access to education of a 
majority of the people of Africa increasingly weaken their ability to work 
long, hard and productively. Their poverty increasingly forces them to abuse 
and destroy the land so the bone white of ruined, dead and dying land creeps 
wider across earth satellite pictures like the destroying cancer it is. By 
rending the fabric of society, growing immiserisation is equally surely 
breaking the cycles of production, of reproduction and of surplus generation 
and creating contexts in which all human rights - however defined - are always 
in danger of erosion or extinction.
To regard nutrition, health services and education as the fruits of 
development to be deferred until after high production has been attained is 
self-defeating. Only the well nourished, healthy and literate can consistently 
and increasingly be efficient productive workers. To see access to pure 
water, reduction of women’s workload and child survival as goals for after 
economic recovery is to ensure that there will be, at best, delayed and
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stunted recovery. Women worn out carrying water for miles, tending sick 
children and bearing replacements for those prematurely dead are not merely 
denied their rights as human being3 but drained of the time and energy to
produce more.
Similarly to restore and to expand output requires the fuller participation in
production of the poor - not their exclusion from it. To provide tractors and
large irrigated farms for the few and to ignore, matchets and jembes (cutlasses 
and hoes) and improved seeds for the many is economic madness. Not only will 
it not solve malnutrition (the poor will have no means to buy food); it will 
usually not even restore a viable trend rate of growth of agricultural output. 
To make this case against large public sector agricultural units and ignore 
its applicability to private is to become trapped in ideological tunnel 
vision.
Of course there is a need for balance. Production matters. It requires 
exports as well as textbooks; lorries as well as basic drugs; efficient
factories as well as (indeed to produce) jembes and matchets; taxes as well as 
protected wells. Of course for some crops, in some places, under some
conditions, large units and mechanisation do make social and economic sense.
The point is not to argue for basic services instead of production or
production by the poor instead of by the not so poor. It is to point out that
most present stabilisation and adjustment plans do the reverse: they fail to 
recognise the vital role of basic services and of production by the poor 
without which recovery will be limited and development (even in narrowly 
economistic terms) virtually unattainable.
Stabilisation, Adjustment: And or Instead of Restoring The Human Condition?
Economic malaise, crises and decline have weighed most heavily on poor and 
vulnerable people. There are several reasons for this - none of which is 
surprising but, equally, none is inevitable.
When government resources are reduced, provision of basic services and 
maintenance of infrastructure are cut back. They are usually cut back from 
the periphery - the feeder roads first, the capital city highways last. When 
health services face resource crisis usually rural health posts and clinics
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are hit first and central reference hospitals last. It is to the credit of 
some African states, medical services and communities (and their external 
cooperating partners) that there are exceptions to that pattern - in some 
cases the basic rural and low income urban health services have largely been 
sustained or even, in some respects, strengthened. But in general the greater 
the distance - geographic, gender, indigenous ethnic, social, economic or 
political - from the centres of power, the greater the cutbacks.
Similarly when production falters it is the vulnerable who lose their 
employment, see the product of their self-employment fall, have their
entitlement (income) to food torn away. They do not have the resources to
ride out a crisis nor to give the flexibility to adjust to new ways of earning 
a decent livelihood. Most have indeed adapted - without that they would have 
died. But millions could not adapt; they (largely infants, children and
victims of drought and war) have died. For the poor and vulnerable people of 
Africa death is very close - their margins above survival are often very 
narrow. As the proverb puts it - give a rich man less food and he will grow 
thin; give a poor man less food and he will die.
The crises of falling export earnings and import capacity; of eroding
government revenues and inflationary deficits; of inefficient policies and 
under-utilised capacity are very real. But they are not more real nor more 
important than the crises of rising numbers living in absolute poverty with 
rising infant mortality; of the re-emergence of killer diseases like yaws and 
yellow fever virtually eliminated by the end of the 1950s; of school systems 
near collapse and peasants without tools or seeds. Indeed they are part of 
the same human crisis. The first set of crises exacerbates the latter and 
reducing the latter is a necessary condition for humanly acceptable ways of 
addressing the first.
Therefore, one basic test of all economic recovery and development programmes 
is whether they will improve the human condition - make poor people less poor 
and vulnerable people less vulnerable by making it possible for them to 
produce more and by increasing their access to basic services as well as their 
control over programme and policy formulation and ability to hold decision 
takers and professionals accountable. If a programme cannot pass those tests 
in prospect, and also in operation, it is fatally flawed and itself in need of 
structural adjustment or total redesign. This test is stronger than that
-21-
sometime3 proposed of whether the stabilisation and adjustment programmes are 
the basic cause of poverty (of course they are not) or of whether they address 
the problems of poor and vulnerable people directly injured by some of their 
components (important but inadequate). It is also a test of present, short 
term rehabilitation as well as future, long term development results. Human 
condition recovery must go step by step with production recovery or neither is 
likely to be either efficient or sustainable.
Because the plight of the poor and vulnerable is the most desperate and urgent 
it is useful to indicate more specifically who these people are. Most fall 
into seven groups:
a. victims of prolonged drought and/or ecological degradation whose previous 
sources of income have been wiped out;
b. poor - often female headed - households pushed by land shortages onto 
marginal or sub-marginal land - the pioneers and victims of the "rural 
sponge" effect which has to date limited the rise of open unemployment;
c. households in isolated or peripheral (to main centres) areas who are 
physically and institutionally at the end of the line for all goods and 
services (whether public or private sector) and usually suffer first and 
most severely from decreased flows;
d. small producers - usually primarily engaged in self-provisioning but also 
selling food even when they have a nutritional deficit, because it is 
their basic cash income source - who are unable to increase or even 
sustain ouput in the face of declining access to inputs and static 
relevant technological knowledge;
e. victims of war who are dislocated, like those of drought, with loss of 
access to health, education and water as well as of land, herds, homes, 
tools, seeds and foodstocks and plunged into a context of physical 
insecurity and psychological trauma while government resources and 
physical capabilities are debilitated by war bills and destruction;
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f. "informal" urban sector members whose numbers have risen even as the
incomes of the formal sector they served and supplemented fell and whose 
slum or exurb areas have become ever more crowded and ever less well 
provided with basic services;
g. urban wage earners - formerly above the absolute poverty line - whose 
real wages have plunged so sharply they and other household members have 
had to add on "informal" sector economic activities to limit the
vertiginous fall in their living standards, indeed in many cases to
survive at all.
The Slippery Slope Revisited
How the economies of most African states and the human condition of most
African people came to be so debilitated as they are today matters. It
matters not primarily to win debates or to apportion blame but to understand
how to win clear and "to look our mistakes squarely in the face lest we fall
into repeating them" as Rector Rui Balthasar Santos of Eduardo Mondlane
University once put it.
The radical, general worsening of the situation dates to 1980. After very low 
growth over 1970-75, most African states made fairly rapid economic progress 
over 1976-79 and human condition indicators showed some - even if limited and 
unequally distributed - advances. Since then all but a handful of Africa's 
economies have been on a declining path in terms of per capita output while 
poverty and vulnerability have been growing. Why?
One major answer - probably the dominant one so far as output per capita 
declines in the majority of African states are concerned - is the 1979-1987 
evolution of the international economic environment confronting Africa. The 
1979-82 recession and slow 19 8 3-8 7 recovery in the industrial economies have 
had a disastrous impact on Africa's exports valued in terms of import 
capacity. Over 1976-81 a World Bank study showed several African economies -
e.g. the Cote d'Ivoire and Tanzania - as among the worst affected. Many 
primary products' real values (import purchasing power per unit exported) are 
at 50 year lows and the recent slight recovery in metals and virtually all 
projections give little promise of significant change. At the same time
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protectionism and industrial economy dumping have hampered export 
diversification. The financial flow position has also worsened. Beal net 
concessional finance per capita (grants and new soft loans less interest and 
repayment on old) declined sharply from the mid-1970s to early 1980s and - at 
best - have been stagnant since. Non-concessional flows have gone negative. 
Africa has a debt burden relative to exports greater than that of any other 
region. Payment on present terms is not possible and the attempt to sustain 
it is dramatically limiting imports, choking off recovery and worsening the 
human condition. That is not the view of African governments, the ADB, the 
ECA and the OAU alone, analyses by the World Bank, the US Secretary of the 
Treasury, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer and a banker majority UN 
expert group come to the same conclusion.
Drought - on a virtually continental basis - has exacerbated the already 
unsatisfactory food production trend. After good years in 1985-86, 1987-88 
have again seen several localised droughts. Until food production levels in 
normal years - especially by poor peasants - are much higher, vulnerability of 
output to drought is reduced and holding of reserves (especially at peasant 
household level) augmented, this scourge will regularly derail recovery 
efforts or put them into reverse.
For many African economies the macroeconomic and human costs of war are 
greater than those of any other exogenous shock. Nowhere is this as brutally 
clear as in Southern Africa. Mozambique and Angola production (excluding oil) 
is about half what it would be had South Africa not waged war against them - 
directly and by proxy. As detailed in UNICEF’s Children on the Front Line by 
the end of 1986 1,000,000 human beings were already dead as direct or indirect 
results of the war, up to 12 million driven from their homes, up to 8 million 
in danger of starvation. By the end of this year the toll will be at least a 
third higher.
Other wars equally destructive of the human condition - including life itself 
- are less exogenous, The wars of the Horn of Africa and of the Sudan and the 
disintegration of Uganda into a Hume (not a Locke, still less Rousseau) "state 
of nature” have roots which are deeply indigenous and in some cases centuries 
old. But even in these cases external action and inaction has greatly raised 
the potential for destruction and made resolution of the conflicts harder. 
The external actions include those of other African states as well as of great
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powers - e.g. Libya in Uganda, the mutual destabilisation of the Horn states 
by each other and a fortiori Morocco's colonial conquest of the Sahara 
Democratic Republic's soil.
Not all causes of economic and human condition decline are exogenous. African 
governments have made policy mistakes and have been too slow in responding to 
the worsening external context. In all candour, however, it should be noted 
that many of these decisions were taken on external advice and are now 
attacked by those who once pushed them. However, with the adoption of APPER 
and of national rehabilitation, recovery and renewed development programmes by 
a majority of African states, there has been substantial improvement on the 
economic policy front. That again is not the Judgement solely of the OAU or 
the ECA; the World Bank and the United Nations General Assembly have said the 
same.
However, these economic policies to date frequently do not give adequate 
attention to the human dimension nor enough priority to improving it, not 
simply to increase human welfare but also to sustain and accelerate economic 
growth. That is not a new weakness - it typified most development plans and 
programmes of the 1960s and 1970s. Then, however, with less constrained
resources and a less hostile international economic environment, the old 
export led, dependent, central city and high income group focused model was 
consistent with some improvement in human condition indicators in general and 
in basic services extension in particular. Today and tomorrow no such
compatibility is likely to be within the grasp of most Africa states. Either
the nature and priorities of development will be re-thought and acted upon on 
new premises or what economic growth there is will march hand-in-hand with 
rising levels of inequality and poverty, misery and instability.
One concrete example is health. Life expectancy is much lower and mortality 
much higher in Africa than in the industrial North. The largest single 
difference is in infant and under 5 mortality. These are 30% of all deaths in 
Sub-Saharan Africa but only 2 to 3% in most industrial economies. The main 
causes are neo-natal tetanus, five epidemic diseases (including measles, 
tuberoulosis and polio), malaria, impure water related morbidity (including 
diarrhoea), and malnutrition linked diseases and/or loss of resistance to
disease. For older children and adults malnutrition and impure water related 
diseases, malaria, a handful of epidemic diseases and accidents treatable by
-25-
first aid are the dominant killers.
Urban hospital care is largely irrelevant to reducing these death tolls in 
Africa - as it was in Europe. Yet it engrosses 60 to J0% of the typical 
African health budget. Primary health care (including first aid), basic drug 
lists and supplies, extended immunisation programmes, oral rehydration and 
simple health education (including sanitation ) are of proven low cost 
effectiveness. But they receive 10 to 15% of the majority of African health 
budgets. The case for rethinking and reallocation is clear technically as 
well as in human rights terms. The warning of Cheik Amidou Kane is even more 
timely now than when he first made it in 1985:
Frustrations and failure will mount if we do not immediately 
summon the courage to revise the ways we think and take action.
What Is To Be Done? Roads Back and Forward
To will an end is - if serious - to will a means or a set of means adequate to 
achieve that end. To make the human condition integral and central to 
Africa's economic recovery and development requires a comprehensive political 
and socio economic strategy encompassing at least eight elements:
a. recognition that people matter and are both the subjects and ends of and 
the main means and actors to attaining stabilisation, recovery and 
renewed development;
b. understanding that throwing away much of Africa's most basic factor of 
production - the labour of its people - as many modernisation and narrow 
stabilisation strategies do by excluding the poor and vulnerable, is 
economically wasteful and inefficient;
c. acting on the reality that marginal rates of economic as well as social 
return from enabling poor people to produce more are often high. The 
real problem often is making small, contextual, poor people centred 
projects visible to central decision takers and credible to bureaucrats 
and analysts - and then altering regulations to be compatible with 
implementing them;
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d. comprehension that health, education and pure water are not merely human 
and social goods (basic as that point is) but are important to
maintaining present and raising future economic productivity and to 
making possible fuller participation in production by women who are the 
chief victims of illiteracy and the human beings on whose backs falls the 
burden of fetching water and caring for the sick;
e. focusing on employment and production, not subsidies and relief; e.g.
through public works programmes to relieve drought or seasonal income 
losses;
f. articulation of short term priorities to lay foundations for long run
sustained development; e.g. in applied, field tested, peasant user
friendly, producer cost effective agricultural research begun now to make 
it possible to sustain 5Í agricultural growth in the late 1990s. Until 
then input restoration, infrastructural rehabilitation and generalisation 
of best known farmer or (more rarely) off-the-shelf research techniques 
can restore 4 to 5Í output growth - but not beyond;
g. political as well as economic awareness that participation in production 
by poor people is crucial to underpinning their survival and the 
improvement of their human condition. Without it their social and 
political participation will remain limited and perpetually at risk;
h. comprehension of the extreme economic inefficiency of rending the fabric 
of society - strikes and riots, go-slows and loss of morale, steadily 
growing grinding poverty and recurrent economic disasters without human 
rehabilitation are devastating in narrow economic as well as social, 
political and human terms.
The poor and the vulnerable are not amorphous masses; they are groups of human 
beings. To fail to see what their needs are as perceived by themselves is to 
exclude them. To suppose their needs and capabilities are uniform is to 
render many people invisible. In no case have these errors and blindnesses 
been as common or as persistent as in that of women. Most African women are 
excluded or invisible but also over-burdened and under-assisted. The basic 
barriers to economic as well as human development posed by the excessive
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workload most African women bear are rarely recognised clearly. The 
implications of the gender division of labour in agriculture are yet to be 
taken account of by agricultural research and extension. These are central 
elements in any serious effort to improve the human condition. After all over 
half of our people are women and they care for our children, tend our sick, 
collect our water and fuel and produce most of the food we eat. How to 
address them is not simple and varies from context to context. But three 
elements are crucial:
a. universal access - to literacy, to basic education, to primary health 
care, to pure water, to agricultural inputs, to fuel - is 
disproportionately beneficial to women because when access is limited 
they are disproportionately deprived of them;
b. serious attention must be addressed to reducing women’s workload - e.g. 
by closer water and health facilities, by programmes (e.g. immunisation) 
reducing child illness, by improving technologies relevant to female 
tasks (e.g. food processing, moving water and fuelwood as well as food 
production);
c. women should be centrally involved in planning and taking decisions about 
projects and programmes which will primarily affect them, e.g. rural 
water supply and maintenance, sanitation, food crop research and 
extension.
To will a strategy should lead to addressing questions of method. To cross a 
river requires a bridge, a raft, a boat, a tunnel or a ford (or perhaps a very 
good swimmer!). The same is true of economic recovery and development 
strategies giving central priority to the human dimension.
It should be made clear that the three goals of standard stabilisation and
structural adjustment strategies do matter. They are incomplete rather than 
irrelevant or inherently in the wrong direction. More production is crucial. 
But in addition more of it must be by poor people. Reduced external and
fiscal imbalances are necessary - but priority should go to increasing supply
and not cutting uses important to the poor and vulnerable. Bad policies and 
restrictions inhibiting production and especially poor people organising to 
better their own human condition should be done away with, but not in any
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false faith in the perfection of markets or universal goodwill of the powerful 
and rich.
But those elements are not, by themselves, enough. More are needed. These 
include priorities in government expenditure which include and move toward 
universality, e.g. more primary and preventative health care relative to 
hospitals and more food availability to poor people (through their own 
production or earning incomes adequate to buy it). That in turn requires much 
more emphasis on increased productive employment and self-employment.
The importance of moving to universal access to basic services has already 
been underlined. With it goes development of basic survival, disaster period 
support and rehabilitation mechanisms. Disasters will recur; the question is 
how to minimise their human damage and to speed the progress of rehabilitation 
- neither of which national nor (a fortiori) international disaster relief 
mechanisms have done very well to date. Again closely linked is acting on the 
perception that environmental and ecological protection is vital to the future 
human condition of poor Africans. Millions are being condemned to life 
sentences of poverty and to early deaths by the present pace of environmental 
degradation and destruction.
These priorities require both production and government spending. Budgetary 
balance should be restored and sustained primarily by increasing revenue.
Domestically more production can allow more tax revenue and more efficient and 
progressive tax systems. But in the short run Africa needs additional 
external support. Additional support which meets the tests that accepts the 
primacy of African goals, respects the knowledge and judgement of Africans can 
be used to meet African requirements for improving their human condition 
through their economic recovery and development and is provided in a context 
within which African peoples and states can hold its agents accountable.
This conceptualisation is not - especially in this full-blooded and 
consistently articulated a form - dominant in Africa today. But neither is it 
absent or simply the importation of an external intellectual fad. In
fragmentary forms, diverse formulations and different degrees of 
comprehensiveness and forcefullness it is both widespread and gaining ground 
from farmsteads to capitals, from the excluded to the intellectuals, from the
marginalised to the powerful and in commitment and praxis as well as principle
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and prose. The Khartoum Declaration of March 1988 on the Human Dimension does 
embody priorities and perceptions which were not equally prominent even three 
years ago and however wide the gap between affirmation and action the 
movement is on both fronts not just affirmation.
Accountability - Reconstruction - Pluralism
Accountability is used here in the sense of being able to select, sanction and 
remove leaders or major institutional actors. The second half is normally 
indirect via accountable organisations, e.g., but not only, state or party 
structures. The first half to be reliable and efficient requires adequate 
data from the leaders on their actions in a form allowing independent 
evaluation/judgement and a capacity for such evaluation/judgement by the 
recipients (either alone or with the assistance of professional/intellectual 
supporters or support groups).
The case for accountability is not that all choices/decisions will be 
normatively just or even functionally desirable for those holding the leaders 
to account. * That is an extension of the broader reality that democracy 
neither needs to be nor can be defended on the basis that under it all 
decisions are just and/or functional in respect to the goals which led to 
their being taken. The case is that without it democracy is at best 
voluntarily given by leaders - as is participation - and selection in and out 
is likely to be even less efficient from human condition/human rights 
perspectives. That case, like the one for participation, is evidently a mixed 
normative/functional one.
The immediate relevance of pluralism is that independent/autonomous 
organisations (or sub-organisations) provide channels through which to route 
and bases from which to press for accountability. Which organisations depends 
on contexts, e.g. trade unions and religious groups have been the most evident 
and general actors in these roles.
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Some Practical Issues in Accountability
Accountability nationally is fragmented, uneven and usually incomplete and 
feeble in SSA. Formal structural examination does not help understand many 
cases because the actual processes and accountabilities vary widely, e.g. the 
single Party states in Tanzania and Kenya afford very different degrees of 
power to enforce accountability to peasants absolutely and relative to other 
groups. Similarly ombudspersons, where effective at all, usually tend not to 
provide not primarily access to the poor who would otherwise have none but 
improved access for diligent middle class members who often could have used 
political or formal legal alternatives.
Further, severe processual problems arise especially among levels. For 
example, a structure in which a political structure is relatively open and 
accountable from the base up and is explicitly superior to the governmental 
structures officially, should, on the face of it, guarantee accountability. 
But problems arise:
1. if each Party level can call each government level to account incoherence 
and wide divergences in praxis are likely but otherwise the base up then 
across and top down way of holding accountable is very cumbersome and 
agonizingly slow to base community level;
2. contextual differences and direct local accountability and national 
coherence are hard to reconcile and it is not safe to assume either that 
the latter is trivial or that the closer to the base political or 
governmental institutions/personnel are the greater their concern with 
the human condition or feeling of responsibility to poor people (if 
anything the reverse seems to be the case on average though with a very 
wide scatter of particular cases);
3. acceptance of accountability and perception of responsibility does not 
lead automatically to meaningful acceptance of base level participation 
in operational policy articulation, formulation and decision taking still 
less to a guarantee that policies will in fact serve their intended 
beneficiaries well, cost efficiently or even at all.
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Especlally for External Agencies
External agencies have very genuine problems in respect to accepting and 
operating client accountability. They already have accountability structures 
to their governing councils and/or parent ministries. These are usually along 
standard inter-governmental organisation or national institutional lines. 
They do not (even when the council does include South governments) result in 
real accountability to any particular client on any specific issue even at 
national level. At best there is an openness to listen to client critiques 
and to try (on at best a voluntary normative responsibility basis) to respond 
to them. More rarely there is also involvement of clients in programme design 
and results monitoring.
It is much easier to criticise this pattern than to suggest alternatives. 
Multiple lines of accountability leading to very different institutions and 
groups will lead to conflicts and conflicting demands. How these can be 
minimised, guidelines for weighting different obligations devised and a 
workable conflict resolution procedure created is by no means self-evident 
even in principle let alone in the context of an external agency in any one 
host setting and least of all across any array of widely divergent host 
settings. Yet to make the attempt for some agencies in some host contexts is 
essential if operational progress is to be made.
Promotion, Empowering, Enjoining, Sanctioning
Achieving progress toward greater and broader effective access to human rights 
and a fuller and less precarious human dimension to rehabilitation and
development require complex processes. The failure to realise and to 
articulate that realisation is partly the result of the parallelism rather 
than interaction of the human dimension and human rights approaches.
Advocates of the former stress rational explication and normative campaigning 
to promote change and resource allocations to empower it. They are less prone 
to considering structures to forestall and procedures to enjoin deviations 
from stated goals and still less to consider how offenders (or at the least 
offences) could be sanctioned and grievances redressed. Human rights lawyers 
tend to stress sanctioning and enjoining (by court cases or public pressure)
plus a different style of normative promotion with less attention to
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institutional means to prevent or limit harm and still less to resource
provision to empower states, and societies as well as persons, smaller 
communities and enterprises, to achieve, to provide and to exercise human
rights. Logically the two approaches are complementary but with so little
interaction to date this is not obvious and they are often misconstrued as 
alternative or antagonistic.
Promotion (or consciousness and coalition building) is a first step toward
realising change. People - including groups with substantial cumulative 
actual or potential power - need to be convinced:
a. the change is desirable;
b. as well as practicable;
c. and will serve their needs and/or interests.
Without that base the only way to achieve change is top down imposition (or 
small scale quasi-anarchic parallel system construction) which is not very 
compatible with human dimension/human rights concerns.
Empowerment involves: first, identifying what specific resources (by no means 
only financial or even only material resources more generally) are needed to 
achieve what goals, by (and for) whom over what time span and second, devising 
ways to mobilise additional or reallocate existing resources to those ends. 
This is not a trivial matter - Damascus Road conversions are not always 
necessary (some governments and leaders, as well as many poor people, do 
believe in human rights and do give priority to the human dimension) and are 
rarely sufficient. It does no good to seek to sanction a very poor country 
for not instantly providing universal literacy, universal access to primary 
health care and universal adequate dietary entitlements (especially as no 
state has actually achieved any of these fully). Persons and small 
communities (or enterprises) need political space to organise and to act, 
access to knowledge, trained personnel and genuinely supportive expert 
assistance in specialised areas, as well as material and financial resources. 
Will alone is not enough. Societies and states need the same. The political 
space may be international (it is dangerous to be a radical democratic 
socialist near the USA or a quasi-capitalist pluralist near the USSR) or 
national (entrenched indigenous elite minorities and less inherently elitist 
bodies such as some trade unions and student or intellectual caucusses can
rde3tabilise radical or even not so radical reformist governments - vide the 
road to the assassination of Thomas Sankara). The other resource needs are 
very similar in type albeit on a different scale and with different particular 
parameters from those of persons and small communities. True states and
societies often have more space to reallocate than poor people and their
organisations/support groups but the need for more usually remains.
Promotion and empowerment are not enough. Both genuine mistakes and hostile 
intentions (including vested interests in lethargy and an easy life as well as 
in enjoyment of exploitative profit or non-accountable power) do exist and
will continue to do so. Therefore it is crucial to avert, prevent and enjoin
actions or inactions which hamper, halt or reverse progress toward fuller 
attainment of human rights.
Prevention not redress after damage is done and structures leading to 
appropriate initial actions not procedures for enjoining wrong ones are the 
basic institutional and processual goals. Institutional structures which 
build in participation and accountability (as well as ones which ignore or 
prevent them) can be devised and operated. Resource allocation criteria in 
favour of the human dimension approach can be articulated and prospective 
polices, ongoing processes and retrospective evaluation of results monitored 
in the light of these criteria.
Institutions can facilitate and create a normal pattern of acceptable conduct. 
They can limit the number and degree of but cannot avert deviations. The 
processual goal at that point is to identify and to enjoin (socially, 
politically and legally) such deviations promptly and effectively before major 
harm has been done. That requires grievance raising, conciliation and
injunctive relief procedures genuinely accessible to all (including poor 
people and their organisations as well as to weak minority peoples and 
communities) and able to provide prompt, equitable and effective resolutions 
of real or potential conflict.
Finally, there will be violations of human rights and debasement of the human 
condition. Need, honest error and greed combine to ensure that. To create 
incentives to avert their multiplying and to make public the challenges and 
threats to human rights/human dimension there must be laws, legal processes 
and accessible procedures to sanction these offences. Compensation for damage
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done is sometimes an equally important component of effective redress as, most 
people would contend, is the imposition of criminal as well as civil penalties 
on gross offenders.
There is a need to pay attention to causation. Need based offences do not - 
with very rare exceptions - justify criminal sanctions. Hanging every peasant 
who cuts down trees or bushes for fuel or house poles in ecologically at risk 
areas is neither an equitable nor a conceivably effective way of halting 
erosion, desertification (strictly speaking neo-desertification) or 
deforestation. (Indeed the wood requirement of gallows would be so great as 
to have the reverse effect.) Empowerment (in this case by silviculture 
education plus relevant seedlings, by state or community reafforestation and 
erosion control, by alternative fuel provision and/or by selective, voluntary, 
assisted resettlement) is a precondition for halting need based erosion of the 
human condition (often especially that of the violators and their children). 
When empowerment is in process, civil regulations are needed as is their 
enforcement - fining those who chop down genuinely community planted and 
tended trees is hardly unreasonable and may be essential to their survival 
without the use of less desirable vigilante tactics.
Honest error should also not be confused with greed or malice. Indeed honest 
error after careful study of the issue and evaluation of options in a 
participatory, accountable context should rarely be sanctioned at all. To do 
so is to create an incentive never to decide but always to postpone or to 
refer and never to risk an innovation. What needs to be sanctioned is 
negligence. Within negligence there are degrees. For example, the "ship of 
weevils" case cited above is gross and culpable negligence (analogous say to 
reckless or even drunken driving) while failure to check in detail how an oil 
well would affect a twenty family fishing village on the same islet (or how 
their boats would affect well platforms) may well constitute a much less 
serious offence (analogous say to careless driving).
Severe sanctions should apply to violations related to greed - for power, for 
non-accountability, or material gain. The first goal is to stop the offence 
and the broader to avert (or at lest reduce) its repetition. If major damage 
has been done, securing redress (from the offender if possible, otherwise from 
more or less innocent parties - in practice likely to be taxpayers or users of 
other public services if the state reimburses - more able to bear the cost
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than the initial victims) is important but limiting future damages to future 
victims is always of at least equal importance. For example, the dead of 
Bhopal cannot be compensated; a crippling judgement against Union Carbide (and 
any judgement adequately materially compensating the living victims and the
heirs of the dead would be crippling) would go far toward saving tens of
thousands of lives in the future. Because the exposure to public opinion of a 
high profile sanctioning process is seen as costly and the real risk of
sanctions are perceived as good economic reason to allocate resources to avoid
being sanctionable, the process matters by itself in addition to the impact of 
its outcome. Union Carbide has been shaken (almost to pieces) by the Bhopal 
case (and its less dramatic West Virginian analogue) and other chemical 
companies appear to have decided that, at least to some extent, prevention and 
safety pay. Whether the extent is adequate to date is a very different 
question, the shift has begun and pressure now is for continuing and 
broadening it not against an unyielding wall of denial of risks and 
responsibilities.
Sanctioning institutions and structures matter. The law's delay is proverbial 
- Bhopal is already beginning to make Dicken's Jarndyce and Jarndyce look 
like an understatement rather than a caricature. Thought (and action on it) 
as to what civil and criminal remedies are needed for human rights 
violations/human condition debasement is needed. The issues are complex - 
criminal law processes often do not cover redress to victims; in civil cases 
procedures other than standard gladiatorial court contests may offer effective 
redress faster, especially if criminal procedures are not needed. But access 
is crucial no matter how appropriate the institutions and procedures. Access 
to specialist personnel (lawyers but also social and economic damage 
'quantifiers’/analysts) and to financing the costs of the process (ideally 
from a state or society provided source available to those demonstrating that 
they appear to have a genuine, serious grievance). Poor people do not and in 
any practicable and equitable legal system cannot, argue, finance, win major 
court cases by themselves. They need specialists to support them and money to 
pay them - both of which are often unavailable in Africa (or indeed to a 
greater or less degree in virtually all countries).
Pluralism - Potential Relevance
The role, if any, of pluralism as defined in this paper relates to its ability 
to increase the probability that persons - especially poor persons - will be 
able to organise themselves to act, to influence the actions of others and to 
hold other major actors to account.
At the national provincial and basic community level three clusters of issues 
or topics appear to be central: a.) civil society and its room to organise and 
to act; b.) accountability and, c.) access to channels designed to protect 
empowerment.
Civil society is used here as a shorthand for freedom of self organisation, 
self expression and self operated action initiatives especially but not only
at base level. It need not mean pluralism in the North American sense and is
no more inconsistent (or at any rate antagonistically contradictory) with 
decentralised, democratic single mass (or just conceivably cadre) party 
systems than with bourgeois democratic structures.
The necessity of room for manoeuvre for civil society rests on two legs:
1. people in base communities or action groups have knowledge of their own
needs and potentials no one else does or can have;
2. unless poor people and marginalised groups are able to participate - in 
production, in mobilisation, in decision-taking and in calling 
decision-takers (including their own leadership) to account there will be 
no objective and especially not institutional power base to protect their 
interests from counter-attacks by other interest groups who are organised 
(especially from bureaucrats, a sub-class ubiquitously part of governing 
coalitions whose interests in orderliness and a quiet life posit 
cooperation with civil society if and only if it is well organised, 
significant to the economy and able to inform, or at least to influence 
substantially, the political process).
In practice room for manoeuvre requires self-organisation and control over 
organisations. While this could in principle be done through single channel 
institutional structures, there is good logical (as well as historic
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experience) reason to doubt its practical adequacy:
1. some aspects require immediacy and operational autonomy. Even with local 
level freedom of action (presumably within limits or quite disfunctional 
disorder is likely) within nationally integrated single channel 
structures it is doubtful whether this can be achieved or sustained and 
reasonably certain it can be achieved more easily and sustained more 
securely with multiple organisational structures;
2. the cases for specialisation and division of labour and for competition 
are not negligible nor are inherently capitalist much less neo-liberal 
(as Comrade Gorbachev now seems to agree - albeit his case for 
quasi-pluralisra is both purely functional and within a control frame
which is arguably too rigid for the quasi-pluralism sought to have
•>
adequate vitality and impact or even much staying power). The most 
evident cases are religious and cultural organisations. However, almost 
equally strong ones can be made out for economic interest (or sub-class) 
based organisations, for informational channels and for gender and age
based groups. Finally it is simply untrue that all local level
organisations or actions need to be consolidated into provincial and
national structures so long as certain coordination and frame information 
and some mechanisms to correct damaging inconsistencies exist.
Accountability has been sketched above as has the potential contribution 
pluralism can make toward strengthening it. There are, however, two very real 
problems. Multiple channels and organisations do not guarantee internal
accountability of any. Lack of accountability in SSA is frequently pervasive 
not limited to central political institutions. Indeed on the whole there 
appears to be a correlation between political channel non-accountability and 
non-accountability of other organisations. As it is by no means 1 to 1 this 
should not be cause for despair but it is cause for further reflection as to 
the conditions and contexts appropriate/conducive to achieving and sustaining 
accountability in various types of organisations, especially ones large and 
complex enough that direct, face to face accountability to all the members is 
impracticable and indirect mechanisms are needed.
The second problem is that the practice of accountability takes time. This is 
not advanced on the basis that it need slow down action so much as to be
disfunctional. Rather more basic is the observable fact that while most 
members want accountability to be available, so long as leaders and officials 
deliver what are broadly viewed as acceptable results, only a small minority 
of members are willing to devote much time to enforcing and operating 
accountability. Unfortunately unless a certain ongoing base level of 
accountability praxis exists it is wishful thinking that it can suddenly be 
turned on when things go wrong (not normally the time at which officials or 
managers are most likely to welcome it!).
A final, more specialised, problem affecting a number of countries is that war 
is inherently a less or less fully accountable process than most others. This 
is not true of all aspects but it is valid for a range of strategic and 
tactical decisions, actions and reviews of results which in civil analogues 
would (or at any rate should) be much more open to scrutiny and review. If 
war is a central factor in a polity/economy this accountability gap tends to 
broaden and to become pervasive even in sectors which in peacetime would (or 
at any rate might) be accountable. However, on the face of it (and rather 
sketchy observation of a limited number of cases) this problem is unique to 
central political institutions and bodies under their control (or purporting 
to be so) so that the spread effect might be checked or limited by 
participatory pluralism.
Protecting empowerment - especially of poor persons and groups (sub-classes) 
which are predominately poor or vulnerable - is central to genuine adoption 
and, more especially, evolution and survival of a "human condition"/"right to 
development" oriented strategy and praxis. The impact of pluralism is 
unfortunately, distinctly problematic. This is not an inherent element in 
pluralism but rather of the probable results of partial pluralism in societies 
in which resource distribution (including time, knowledge and influence 
on/power over central political institutions) is radically unequally 
distributed.
For example, trade unions are historically - not only but perhaps especially 
in SSA - most effective at organising employees with above average skills and 
wages. Their interests are unlikely to be identical (even if they may be 
complementary) to those of workers with lower skills and wages and a fortiori 
to those unemployed and/or potential employment entrants. In any case in SSA 
non-wage predominantly labour incomes - i.e. peasants, other household
producers, small scale enterprise operators - are central to far more 
households (and in a majority of countries are larger even in absolute 
magnitude) than are middle and large employer wage payments. Their interests 
are in some areas analogous or at least compatible with those of trade unions 
but in others they really are competitive. Strong trade unions with no 
significant analogous peasant, co-op, artisanal or small commercial groups may 
be a step toward pluralism but it may also be a step toward greater, not 
lesser, marginalisation and disempowerment cf most poor persons, households 
and communities.
The answer does not lie in suppressing or co-t.; ting trade unions. It lies in 
building up equally strong analogue organisations in other labour income 
sub-sectors. But until that is achieved the view that trade union strength 
and freedom of manoeuvre may not serve the interests of the majority of poor 
households without political constraints (government or party) is by no means 
simply or necessarily disingenuous or intended to mystify.
The same point can be made in respect to professional organisations. 
Professionals usually find it relatively easy to organise (as do university 
students). Their roles in spearheading changes of regime are frequent and 
well documented. In at least a majority of cases - e.g. Sudan 1985 - they are 
fairly unproblematic. But their subsequent role is problematic.
Professionals do constitute a sub-class with fairly easily definable and often 
quite clearly self-perceived interests. These are at best partly compatible 
with those of poorer sub-classes and in many areas do conflict (e.g. 
professionals1 enthusiasm for accountability is, if anything, less pervasive 
or all-encompassing than that of political leaders!).
Constitutions, Constitutional Orders and Pluralism
In SSA the average gap between constitutional orders defined as basic 
political/civil society goals and operating principles and constitutions is 
exceptionally wide. The standard points that constitutions:
f
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a. do not comprehend important parts of the constitutional order;
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b. exhibit substantial gaps between constitutional (in either order or 
document sense) goals and practice; and
c. at least procedurally tend to lag behind praxis
may well be true generally but are the basic issues only in a handful of 
cases.
Nor is the criticism that there is a rhetorical gap between constitutional 
goals/stated praxis and reality so wide and permanent as to bring the 
constitution into discredit, by itself, an adequate critique. Even the
argument that constitutions are used to mystify and to manipulate by dominant 
decision taking coalitions (often quite narrow ones) which have very different 
goals and preferred operating principles may well miss the bottom line in a 
majority of cases.
Many African constitutions are simply irrelevant. They do not in any 
meaningful and even potentially operational sense represent the goals or
operating principles of any significant interest groups/sub-classes, are not 
seen as relevant to the constitutional order and exist because it is believed 
that, like national anthems, coats of arms and flags, constitutions are 
something that states have to have for ceremonial and formal symbolic 
purposes.
Historic Burdens
The reasons for this situation are by no means obscure. Pre-colonial
Sub-Saharan African polities did not have written and often did not have 
formally codified oral constitutions. (The exceptions to the first rule were 
almost without exception both transitory and cases of pre-colonial
neo-colonialism, e.g. the Fanti Confederacy and the Rehoboth Kaptaincy.) They 
certainly had constitutional orders and frequently evolving, disintegrating or 
structurally changing ones but formal constitutions of the Western type played 
negligible roles in them. The colonial states also had constitutional orders 
and praxis to match. In many cases they literally did not have constitutions 
and where in some sense they did these were primarily pieces of administrative 
and organisational law which at most were incomplete formats of some basic (or
less basic) operational procedures. Nor can it be asserted that the 
constitutions of the metropolitan states were the actual constitutions of the 
colonial states - very much au contraire.
The first round of independence constitutions, virtually without exception, 
were imposed and formed by the departing colonial state with quite limited 
input from the emergent domestic constitutional order. This did less than 
nothing either for their contextual appropriateness and ability or for 
commitment not simply to them but more generally to constitutions as documents 
of real significance. The exceptions include Ethiopia but in that case the 
Imperial Constitutions were luxury consumer goods import rather like the 
Western liberal/philosophy elements used as Christmas tree ornaments on the 
Tsarist state by Peter and Katherine the Great while the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
Confederal Constitution was a foreign imposition (even if one which may well 
have expressed a desired constitutional order so far as Eritrean civil society 
was concerned) and was eroded, abridged and finally abrogated by the dominant 
Ethiopian 'partner1. The other two exceptions are Angola and Mozambique where 
revolutionary movements drafted and enacted them. While idealistic (in the 
technical sense of that term) despite their Marxist-Leninist form they were
seen as more serious documents and might have been so had both states not been
engulfed by wars of resistance to external aggression. Indeed arguably 
Mozambique has had an evolution of its constitutional order at least in part 
organically linked to constitutional evolution (including as is necessary in 
this case the Party constitution).
Second Stage Limitations
Subsequent constitutions have rarely emerged from genuine reflective and
participatory processes. This is fairly evident in the case of the products
of coups and of elite revolutions but is of broader relevance. The post 
military government Ghanaian and Nigerian constitutions were in certain senses 
the outcome of reflection and of participatory processes. However, they 
focused so heavily on averting repetition of particular routes to breakdowns 
which had led to military takeovers as to be only formalistically concerned 
with many basic goals, non-operable (i.e. so many checks and balances that 
literal adherence would have prevented action) and remarkably open to new 
abuses and disintegrative tendencies.
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This generalisation does have exceptions. The post independence Tanzanian 
constitutional reshapings (including the Party constitutions) do arise out of 
the evolution of the constitutional order. Whatever their limitations they 
are serious, related to reality and have a participatory and political power 
base grounding. The post Lancaster House Zimbabwean Constitutional amendments 
(here perhaps especially the ZANU-ZAPU merger modifications to the surviving 
ZANU constitution) may well represent the start of a similar process.
Constitutional Orders - And Their Imperfections
African states by definition have constitutional orders - as defined above. 
However, in respect to breadth of base (or more accurately narrowness), actual 
predictability of decisions, stability of procedures and scope or reach of the 
constitutional order many are objectively weak and/or eroding and a number are 
disintegrating or excessively hard to define as other than pathological except 
in terms of the interests of a narrow group of beneficiaries.
There are states which can be characterised - and analysed - as authoritarian 
kleptocracies in which the purpose of public office (however acquired) is 
private gain and the chief means of securing political (or military) support 
is fairly literally buying it. The most frequently cited cases are Zaire, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia but despite its origins and initial democratic patina
the actual nature of the last Nigerian civil state tended in that direction
and Amin’s Uganda was probably an example whose short life related partly to 
over-use of violence, under-use of coherent tactics and strategy and failure 
to maintain adequate relations with external patrons or protectors both 
capable of and willing to ensure survival.
Narrow self-serving decision taking coalition defined and enforced 
constitutional orders are common in Africa - as, historically at least, they 
have been globally. Evidently the degree of narrowness and the particular 
makeup of the sub-class coalitions vary but the basic nature of the 
constitutional orders seem similar. Kenya, the Cote d’Ivoire and (with a 
distinctly different coalition) Somalia are among the examples cited.
Regimes - usually but not always authoritarian - without very clear, broad or 
stable sub-class coalition bases are not uncommon, e.g. Ghana (1982 to date),
Uganda today and in a very different way Malawi (at least until 1986) are
examples. Fragility and real possibility of sharp change (from within the 
regime as well as by its mutation or demise) may be the only common features 
of such systems; certainly the substantive constitutional order goals of 
Flight Lieutenant (retired) J. J. Rawlings and Kamuzu Dr. Hastings Banda do 
not appear to have much in common.
A final strategy of limited, potentially pathological or pathological 
constitutional orders (in this case limited but in danger of more dire
futures) is those which have had greater breadth, participation and scope but 
are disintegrating under external or domestic tensions at or near the level of 
organised, large scale violence and/or disintegration of the resource base 
actually mobilisable by the state and its most important sub-class supporters. 
Post Nimeiri Sudan and post 1975 Zambia illustrate this pattern.
This is not to deny the existence of healthier, more broadly based and
arguably evolving/developing constitutional orders. Zimbabwe, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Botswana are arguably all examples and a case can be made for 
including certain somewhat problematic cases like Senegal and Gambia.
Starting from a human condition/right to development approach the features of 
assent, participation, access, equity and operationality needed to develop 
constitutional orders can be fairly readily articulated. However, because the 
starting points diverge massively (Sierra Leone is not Tanzania, Cape Verde is 
not Equatorial Guinea, Sudan is not Mozambique, Uganda is not Kenya) as do the 
present dominant decision taking coalitions, the concrete possibilities for, 
requirements of and constraints on short term mobilisation and action vary 
widely.
For historic reasons sketched above, except in a handful of cases, 
constitutional order reconstruction and development is a precondition for 
constitutional reform to be effective. Seeking once again to substitute a 
legal engineering superstructure for a constitutional order infrastructure is 
no more likely to be productive now than it has been over 1957-1987.
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Pluralism can play a role in building up the breadth and strength of the 
constitutional order. (It most certainly cannot be created nor to more than a 
very limited extent safeguarded by constitutional provisions.) However, to do 
so many parallel channel and other independent organisations in SSA need to 
look first at their own constitutional orders. These are often just as weak, 
disintegrating or pathologial as those of states.
Envoi
Neo-liberalism and growthmanship both face rapidly waning credibility and 
legitimacy in SSA.
While by no means dominant right to development/human condition strategic and 
tactical approaches - the latter exemplified by the Khartoum Declaration (see 
Annex B) - have gained substantial intellectual, policy maker and operational 
credibility and support.
The substantial roles of participation, self-organisation, decentralisation 
and accountability in these approaches interact with the nature of 
participatory pluralism (at least as defined in this paper).
Where now on either the two development foci or on participatory pluralism and 
constitutional order is certainly a question subject to intellectual 
examination at varying degrees of abstraction and distance. However, from the 
point of view of those - predominantly Africans in SSA - whose well-being and 
in many cases literal survival depends on reversal of 1980s trends, the 
challenge is more akin to the Mara proverb cited by Mwalimu Nyerere in respect 
to the work of the South Commission:
Rabbit, where are you going?
I am going to kill the Elephant!
Can you really do it?
Well, I'll try and try again!
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Principal Sources
World Bank, Comparative Analysis and Data Division, Economic 
Analysis and Projections Department (June 19814), World 
Development Report 1985; UNICEF, Statistics on Children In 
UNICEF Assisted Countries (April 1985); UNICEF Ghana: Situation 
Analysis of Women and Children (July 198^ 4).
Notes
a) 1960 data refer to a year between 1959 and 1961; 1970
between 1969 and 1971; late 1970s between 1975 and 1980; 
1980s to 1982, 1984 or 1985.
b) Defined in terms of location within a 5 kilometre radius. 
May overstate for urban population when facilities
available are small.
c) 1970 and late 1970s urban figures may be overstated by
failing to relate number of water points to population.
d) 1970 and 1978 figures for urban and possibly rural areas
overstate by failing to relate number of drop-holes to
supposed user population.
e) Adjusted for length of primary cycle. ( ) are unadjusted 
figures. Because of the primary/middle school division 
Ghana has a shorter primary cycle than most SSA countries.
f) Estimate made by author based on fragmentary data.
TABLE 1
SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS; 
I960 - mid-1980s (a)
Ghana
Late Low Income sub-
1. Average Life Expectancy 
at Birth
2. Infant Mortality Rate
3. Child Death Rate
4. Access to Health 
Facility (b)
5. Public Health Facility 
Visits Per Person
Per Year
6. Health Budget as 
% of GDP
7. Access to Pure Water (c)
Rural
Urban
Total
8. Access to Excreta 
Disposal (d)
Rural
Urban
Total
9. Average Calorie Avail­
ability as a % of 
requirements
10. Child Malnutrition 
(Moderate/Severe)
11. Primary Education 
Enrolment Ratio (e)
12. Adult Literacy
13. Education Budget as 
% of GDP
14. Proportion of Population 
Below Absolute Poverty 
Line (f)
Rural
Urban
1960 1970 1970s 1980s Saharan Africa 
(1982)
45 49 55 53 48
132 107 86 107-120 118
27 21 15 25-30 24
- - - 30 45
- - 0.7 0.4 2(f)
- 1.2 - 0.26 0.95
14 14 48 14
- 86 86 75 62
35 35 60 22
40 40 30 25
- 92 95 65 69
55 56 44 32
92 97 88 68 91
- - 36 50-55 40
38(46) 64(75) 69(80) -(80) 69(-)
27 30 35-45 44
3-9
60-65
30-35
0.85
67-1/2-
72 - 1/2
45-50
2.81
65
35
/
TABLE 2
SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS - SOUTHERN AFRICA 198^ 4 AND SOMALIA
Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mozambique Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe Somalia8
Population (millions) 8.5 1.1 1.5 6.9 14.0 0.6 22.0 6.5 8.5 5.5
Under-5 mortality
(per 1,000 births) 325-375 100 145 280 325-375a 185 185 135 120 174-210
Infant mortality (0-1)
(per 1,000 births) 200a 75 110 160 200a 125 110 85 75 146-180
Infant and child
malnutrition (%) NA 32 NA 31 NA NA (50) 28 NA 16
Average calorie intake •
relative to
requirements (J) 87 (94) 100 97 79 (108) 101 89 89 (105)
Access to health services (30) (89) NA 80 (30) NA (70) 75 71 (20)
Access to safe water 21 (76) (14) (41) (13) 48 (47) 46 (52) 33
Primary enrolment
(*) (1982)° 66 76b 71 46 46b 84b 87b 94 131 15
Adult (over 15) h
literacy (%) (1982) 28 61 70 (36) 27 (61) 85 69 69 16
One-year-olds fully b 87 88vaccinated ($) TB 40 70 91 72 (46) 95b (84) 31DTB 8 82 59 66 (56) 79b (58) 49 68 22Polio 55 77 64 68 (32) 60b (56) 47 63 22Measles 62 75 63 64 (32) 51 (82) 56 55 36
Life Expectancy at birth (41) 55 50 46 (45) 54 52 52 56 45-49
GNP per capita 490 960 530 180 (230) 790 210 470 760 (350)
( ) = 1980 (or nearby year). Somalia re-estimated to include unrecorded remittances.
3 Re-estimated on fragmentary data taking into account impact of war. Standard projections showing 245 under-5
mortality for Angola and 255 for Mozambique assume continuation not reversal of rapid 1975-1980 immediate
post-independence period gains.
p 1983Net ratios except for Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
8 Includes etimates from various unpublished UNICEF studies at various dates 1982 through 1986.
Source: Statistics on Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries, UNICEF, 1986, The State of The World's Children 1987.,
Oxford for UNICEF, 19 87, except for GNP per capita taken from World Bank World Development Report 1986, OUP.
TABLE 3
RATES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION
Sand dune Deterioration Deterioration Rainfed
'
encroach­ in Forest of agricultural General
Countries ment rangelands depletion irrigation problems assessment
Benin , o • ft o ft
Burkina Faso o ft ft ft •ft
Cape Verdi • • ft •ft
Chad •• • ft ft • ft •ft • •
Djibouti • •• ft ft NA */•*
Ethiopia • •• • ft ft • •/••
Gambia • • • ft •ft •
Ghana o ft ft •
Guinea 0 o ft ft • ft
Guinea Bissau 0 o ft ft •
Kenya o • ft • ft ft • m /aa
Mali • •ft • ft ft ft • •
Mauritania • • ft • ft ft ft W m
Niger ft • ft ft • ft •ft
•/■•
Nigeria o ft • ft ftft ■ ■
Senegal « • ft ft ft
Somalia • 1 ft m Wat
Sudan •ft ft ft ft g
Tanzania o ft ft o a
Uganda o • ft o ft
United Rep.Cameroon 0 ft ft 0 a
Zimbabwe o ft ft o
KEY: o = Stable. • = Some increase, •• = Significant increase, NA = Not appplicable
Source: (Adapted) "Desertification Control Bulletin", United Nations Environment Programme,
Number 10, May 1984, p. 26 and national data.
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Figure 1 Grain production per capita in 24 African countries affected bv drought. I971M984
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Annex B
Excerpts from The Khartoum Declaration
This declaration was adopted by the UN system sponsored, UN Economic 
Commission for Africa organised and led International Conference on the Human 
Dimension of Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development in March 1988. It was 
subsequently endorsed by the conference of African ministers responsible for 
"human resources" and the 30th Anniversary ECA Council of Ministers meeting 
held in Niamey in April 1988.
The Khartoum Declaration
PREAMBLE
2. The Conference made a deep and detailed analysis of the African situation, 
particularly the current economic crisis and all its ramifications on the 
people of Africa. The Conference is unanimous in its conviction that the 
crisis that confronts the African continent is one that affects the total 
human condition of the continent and its people, men and women alike. It is a 
crisis that challenges the very survival of the African people. It is a 
crisis of Africa’s environment as the desert rapidly overcomes the fertility 
of the land and the coastlines also recede. It is a crisis of the continent's 
natural resources exploited more for the benefit of external interests than to 
meet Africa’s dire needs. It is a crisis of the rich cultures of the African 
people and the cohesion of families broken up by the desperate circumstances 
of the African reality. It is a crisis that threatens to overwhelm Africa and 
her people and, in extremis, to reduce them to the helpless gaze depicted in 
the starving faces of Africa's children in the international media. But it is 
a crisis that can and must be overcome through the concerted and determined 
action of the African people and their societies and States, as they develop a 
clearer understanding of the implications of the current predicament and 
fashion a decisive and coherent plan of action, with the assistance and 
understanding of the international community.
3. We are encouraged in this view by the fact that although Africa has been 
sorely squeezed by the pressures of recent years and millions of Africans have
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suffered severely, no objective observer can fail to be impressed by the
vitality, and human creativity which strive and flourish in spite of 
everything. The large cutbacks and constraints of government and urban
production have stimulated communities to devise their own solutions to the 
problem of meeting their own basic human needs. Self-help groups abound in 
every country; the extended family, though strained, has often provided the 
means of survival of many of its members; examples of community action can be 
found in almost every village. It is important to recognize the enormous 
potential of the human energy and creativity and find ways to harness it
rather than ignore it in the total process of national recovery and 
development. For these and other reasons we repeat that Africa's crisis,
though dire, CAN AND MUST BE OVERCOME
M. As participants in this event, the overwhelming majority of whom come from 
the African continent, we are moved to place on record our collective voice on 
the issues we discussed and we accordingly make this KHARTOUM DECLARATION.
A. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE HUMAN CONDITION IN AFRICA
5. Since the human being is the centre of all development, the human
condition is the only final measure of development. Improving that condition 
is essential for the poor and vulnerable human beings who comprise the
majority of our peoples in Africa. Africa's men and women are the main
factors and the ends for whom and by whom any programme and implementation of 
development must be justified.
6. Regretably, over the past decade the human condition of most Africans has 
deteriorated calamitously. Real incomes of almost all households and families 
declined sharply. Malnutrition has risen massively, food production has
fallen relative to population, the quality and quantity of health and
education services have deteriorated. Famine and war have made tens of
millions of human beings refugees and displaced persons. In many cases, the
slow decline of infant mortality and of death from preventable, epidemic
diseases has been reversed. Meanwhile the unemployment and underemployment 
situation has worsened markedly.
7. Acts of destabilization and aggression, being perpetrated against the
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countries of Southern Africa by the South Africa regime, have also imposed 
massive human and economic costs, greatly in excess of military budgets or 
battle casualties. Of the approximately one million human beings dead in 
Southern Africa as a result of South African aggression over 1980-86 about one 
hundred thousand were war-dead, narrowly defined. Of the approximately thirty 
billion dollars in lost production, most relates to the creation of chaos and 
the loss of peasants' crops and national production.
8. Production and other economic aspects of development - especially 
distribution - are of crucial importance. Production by the poor is vital if 
they are to become more able to meet at least their basic needs. But it is 
just as important who produces what. Production of food, of basic consumer 
goods, of agricultural inputs and construction materials, of basic services 
such as health, education, and pure water, as well as of exports are central 
to improving the human condition. Unsustainable imbalances do matter.
9. Nutrition imbalances are as crucial as trade imbalances. High infant 
mortality requires just as immediate and as serious an attention as high rates 
of inflation or huge budget deficits. Ultimately the trade, inflation and 
budget imbalances are serious obstacles to development because they are 
barriers to enabling the poor to produce more; to the vulnerable to surviving 
and rehabilitating themselves; and to the state and the society achieving 
universal access to basic services.
10. Therefore, a basic test for all stabilization, adjustment and development 
programmes is whether they will improve the human condition from their 
inception or, on the contrary, worsen it. Social services and human resources 
development programmes have high short-, medium- and long-term payoffs on 
economic as well as on broader development criteria.
11. They are relevant to the reversal of unsustainable imbalances since 
survival and rehabilitation assistance to the most vulnerable groups - 
international refugees and displaced persons, disabled persons, youth, women 
and children - is an important element in reversing production losses. 
Similarly, the engagement of Africa's most basic resource - its approximately 
250 million economically active people - in production, is essential to 
restoring growth as well as development.
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12. The human-centred strategy to the implementing of the Lagos Plan of 
Action, APPER and UN-PAERD is vital for reaching out to the aspirations and 
needs of Africa’s people and especially their poor and vulnerable majorities. 
It is deliverable through the appropriate mobilization, allocation and use of 
resources. To bring this about it will be essential to restore the strained 
and torn fabrics of our societies, make popular participation in 
decision-making processes effective, ensure the preservation of basic human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and eliminate policies that discriminate 
against minorities and vulnerable groups.
13. Progress in advancing the human condition in Africa depends on the 
structure, pattern and political context of socio-economic development. The 
problems and weaknesses in these areas must therefore be recognized and 
attempts must be made to tackle them in order to achieve the objectives of 
social and human development. This is also necessary because the economic 
crisis which Africa faced from the late 1970s found fertile ground in the 
structural and political weaknesses that bred the germs that hastened the 
intolerable deterioration in the human condition.
14. A fundamental problem is the fast rate of population growth and the 
uneven and uneconomic distribution of the population in the different age 
groups. The youthful population makes high demands on educational, medical 
and other social services while the large number of college graduates and 
school leavers that enter the labour market each year creates an imbalance 
between labour supply and demand.
15. A further structural factor is the urban bias and socially unequal 
distribution of critical factors and resources for human development such as 
employment, income, food and nutrition and health and education. As is well 
known, this distribution is biased against the majority of the population 
living mainly in the rural areas and in favour of the politically vocal 
minority in the urban enclaves. Economic issues have overshadowed social 
concerns and have prevented African countries from according the needed 
centrality to the human dimension and the human factor.
16. Finally, the political context for promoting healthy human development 
has been marred, for more than two decades, by instability, war, intolerance, 
restrictions on the freedom and human rights of individuals and groups as well
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as overcentralization of power with attendant restrictions on popular 
participation in decision-making. In such a context, the motivation of many 
Africans to achieve their best in productivity and the enhancement of their 
own and society’s well-being has been severely constrained. In times of 
economic crisis, the politically stronger social groups and individuals 
survive while the weaker ones go under in increasing deprivation, social 
dislocation, hunger, ill-health or death.
B. THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES
17. From the causes mentioned so far flow the consequences of wretched 
misery, marginalization and - for millions - very literally premature death. 
The severity of the African crisis is such that country after country has been 
putting in place structural adjustment programmes in their effort to halt 
their economic degradation and achieve a turn-around. Unfortunately, far too 
many of these programmes - whether nationally conceived or in collaboration 
with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the donor community - 
are rending the fabric of the African society. Rather than improve the human 
condition, some Structural Adjustment Programmes have aggravated it because 
they are incomplete, mechanistic and of too short a time perspective.
18. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) are incomplete because they are 
often implemented as if fiscal, trade and price balances are ends in 
themselves and are virtually complete sets of means to production increases. 
Human condition imbalances as related to employment, incomes, nutrition, 
health and education do not receive equal priority in attention to 
macro-economic imbalances. Unless and until they make the elimination of 
these human condition imbalances central targets, stabilization and adjustment 
programmes cannot provide Africa’s growth and development dynamic.
19. They are too mechanistic in being inadequately grounded in, or sensitive 
to specific national economic, human and cultural realities. This is 
aggravated by an incomplete articulation which allows the gaps between macro 
models and contextual realities to remain largely unobserved. Nor can we 
evaluate how rapidly production can be expanded; where, by whom and of what. 
Thus their human condition impact remains inadequately projected instead of 
being at the centre of target-setting, policy formulation and programme or
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project choice.
20. They are in too short a time perspective. Africa cannot wait for the 
attainment of external equilibrium and fiscal balance before seeking to 
improve the human condition, nor can long-term human investment to strengthen 
the institutional, scientific, technical and productive capacity operating in 
environmental balance be postoned. That is essential to attaining the more 
stable and less vulnerable economic position that we aspire to for the African 
continent.
21. Further, we must place squarely on record that the external context 
confronting Africa continues to deteriorate. The terms of trade losses of 
1986 vastly exceeded net resource transfers to Africa. APPER is not receiving 
either the new concessional transfer support or the debt burden relief it 
projects as essential, or which UN-PAERD committed the international community 
to providing. This is not simply an African view - the World Bank has 
repeatedly said the same thing as has the UN Secretary-General1s Advisory 
Group on Financial Flow for Africa, a majority of whom are practising bankers.
22. We welcome the increased concern for the human dimension in stabilisation 
and adjustment programmes, broadly expressed within the international 
community. But this is far from being enough. The gap between the expression 
of concern and actual programme implementation remains wide. Human dimension 
elements are additions, often long after programme initiation, rather than 
integral parts of their overall design. Those poor and vulnerable groups to 
be served are often narrowed down to those who are the victims of the 
stabilization programme, rather than addressing the human condition of all the 
absolutely poor and vulnerable people.
23. In the light of all the foregoing, we do not hesitate to reiterate the 
central position that the human dimension should be accorded in the 
stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes, for we are convinced 
beyond doubt that no nation can be great and prosperous if the majority of its 
people are poor, malnourished, illiterate, miserable and perpetually 
vulnerable.
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21). Overall, we Identify five distinct areas on which greater awareness and 
action must be focused by the African governments, the international financial 
institutions and the international community at large. Firstly, all 
structural adjustment programmes in Africa must be designed, implemented and 
monitored as part of the long-term framework of Africa's development. These 
programmes must, therefore, be incontrovertibly compatible with the objectives
s
and aspirations of the African people as outlined in the Lagos Plan of Action 
and the Final Act of Lagos. Secondly, the human dimension must be the fulcrum 
of the adjustment programmes. Thirdly, the structural adjustment policies 
must incorporate the relevant adjustments of the social sector. Fourthly, 
considerations must be made of the consequences of macro-policies on the poor 
and vulnerable not only so as to design temporary and independent compensatory 
additional programmes but to make the alleviation of absolute and relative 
poverty and the elimination of gender biases integral parts and factors of the 
adjustment programmes. Lastly, the entire process of monitoring the 
stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes must incorporate the social 
aspects and criteria.
25. We regard it as the primary responsibility of African Governments to 
develop a richer articulation of the total macro-framework within which to 
reorientate these programmes.
26. Structural adjustment programmes must be made to complement the efforts 
of African Governments to attain their long-term development objectives. 
Consequently, they should, through their effects on the economy and the 
African social fabric, contribute to the preservation of basic human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and help to eliminate policies that discriminate 
against minority and vulnerable groups. Above all, the application of 
structural adjustment measures should restore, not corrode the dignity of the 
African as a human being.
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